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'Materiality' Limits Prosecutors' Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence to Defense

In United States v. Agurs,' the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first
time that criminal prosecutors have a constitutional duty to voluntarily
disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant even when the defense doesn't
request such evidence. The Court, however, limited the scope of this new
obligation by narrowly defining the category of material evidence to which
it applies. It held that the duty arises only when the exculpatory evidence
is so material that had it been disclosed, its use at trial would have created
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt that did not otherwise exist.
Respondent Agurs was convicted of second degree murder in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. At trial she asserted that she
had acted in self-defense in the knife slaying of the victim. The evidence
at trial showed that the victim had been carrying two knives, one of which
was the murder weapon, immediately before he was killed. After the respondent was convicted, her attorney discovered that the prosecutor had
been aware of the victim's criminal record before the trial. The victim had
a history of convictions for violent crimes, including assault and carrying
a deadly weapon. Agurs moved for a new trial on the ground that the
victim's prior criminal record supported her claim of self-defense and thus
should have been disclosed by the prosecution.
The district court denied the motion on the ground that the suppressed
evidence, although favorable to the accused, was not material. The court
found that even if the information had been made available to the defense
for use at the trial, the jury would not have reached a different result. The
court emphasized the belief that the victim's record would have shed no
light on the victim's character not already apparent from the evidence at
trial. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.'
It found that the suppressed evidence was both favorable and material and
that a new trial was required, since the jury might have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been disclosed by the prosecution and used
by the defense at the original trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed on the ground that the evidence was not material within the
rule of Brady v. Maryland.'
The nature and extent of discovery allowed a defendant in a criminal
case may significantly affect his ability to prepare for trial. 5 For this real.
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.S. 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976).
United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1252-54.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 220 (5th Cir. 1975).
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son, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a prosecutor's duty of
candor toward a defendant is an important ingredient of due process.'
Thus, a prosecutor's suppression of materially favorable information may
constitute denial of a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.7
As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, the Supreme Court said that the
deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known
false evidence is incompatible with the "rudimentary demands of justice." 9
The Mooney principle was reaffirmed in Napue v. Illinois.'0 In that case
the Court held that the defendant had been denied his constitutional right
to a fair trial "when the state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows
it to go uncorrected when it appears.""
In Brady,"'the court expanded the Mooney doctrine. Defendant Brady
had been convicted of first degree murder. The murder had been committed in the course of a robbery. Brady admitted at trial that he had participated in the robbery, but claimed that his codefendant had done the
killing. Prior to trial Brady's counsel had requested that the prosecution
allow examination of the codefendant's extrajudicial statements. Several
such statements were disclosed, but the one in which Brady's codefendant
confessed to the actual killing was suppressed by the prosecution and did
not come to Brady's attention until after he had been tried, convicted, and
sentenced. The Supreme Court held that suppression of the codefendant's
confession violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused uPJon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."' 3
Not every instance of prosecutional suppression of evidence results in a
denial of the due process right to a fair trial, however. For a new trial to
be required, the evidence that was suppressed must be of such nature that
its use by the defense at trial would have had a significant impact on the
outcome of the trial. As stated by the Court in Brady, the suppressed
evidence must be "material either to guilt or to punishment.""
Before Agurs the Court had avoided defining the precise degree of materiality necessary to require a new trial, 5 and essentially two standards of
materiality had arisen in the courts of appeals. The standard developed
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Id. at 112.
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Id. at 269.
373 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 87.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967).
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by the District of Columbia Circuit " and adopted in the Ninth 7 and
Tenth' Circuits sought to determine whether the undisclosed evidence, if
brought to the attention of the jury, might have led the jury to entertain a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. If so, a new trial would be
required. This standard of materiality was applied by the court of appeals
in Agurs.5 However, other circuits have rejected that "might have" standard on the theory that it presented only a minimal barrier to a new trial.2
Another standard of materiality is employed by the Second, 2 Fifth,2 2 and
Eighth 2' Circuits. These circuits have required a new trial when the defendant was able to show that there was a significant chance that had the
added evidence been developed, as it undoubtedly would have been by
skilled counsel, a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt could have
been induced in the minds of enough jurors to preclude a conviction.2 The
rule of the First Circuit apparently differed only slightly. 21
The Supreme Court's decision in Agurs resolved the conflict among the
circuits. The Court rejected both standards and established a new, twotier test of materiality based upon whether a specific Brady-type request
had been made. When, as in Brady, the defense specifically requests disclosure of a certain piece of evidence, the prosecution is put on notice that
the defendant desires that particular piece of evidence. 2 Therefore, the
16. See Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
17. United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972); Fields v. Alaska, 524 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1975).
18. United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1974).
19. 510 F.2d at 1253-54.
20. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Ross v, Texas, 474 F.2d 1150,
1153 (5th Cir. 1973).
21. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d
272 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Morrell, 524 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1975). Although the Second
Circuit had adopted the "significant chance" standard, it had added a slight variation. As
prosecutorial culpability for suppressing favorable evidence increases, the level of materiality
necessary to require a new trial decreases. As the culpability of the prosecutor increases from
negligent nondisclosure to deliberate suppression, prophylactic considerations become more
prevalent and eventually paramount. See United States v. Pfingst, 490 F.2d 262, 267 (2d Cir.
1973). This sliding scale of materiality had occasionally been cited with approval by other
courts of appeals. Ross v. Texas, 474 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1973); Clarke v. Burke, 440 F.2d
853 (7th Cir. 1971); Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1973); Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Calley v. Callaway, 519
F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975). There the court stated that "before the nondisclosure of evidence
reaches a level of constitutional significance, the evidence must be 'crucial, critical, [and]
highly significant.' " Id. at 221.
23. Ogden v. Wolff, 522 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1975).
24. See. e.g., United States v. Morrell, 524 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1975).
25. In Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1974), the First Circuit held that
a new trial is not required unless it can be said that if the evidence had been disclosed its
use at trial would have created a reasonable possibility of a different result.
U.S. at
, 96 S.Ct. at 2398-99.
26. -
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first level of materiality applies if there is a specific request and places only
a slight burden on a defendant to show that a prosecutor's suppression of
favorable evidence denied him a fair trial. The Agurs Court determined
that, when the defense request for disclosure is specific, disclosure by the
government is required "if the subject matter of such a request is material,
or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists. '27 When
there is a specific request, the 28prosecutor's "failure to make any response
is seldom, if ever, excusable.
In Agurs the defense had not made a specific request for discovery of the
victim's prior criminal record, and the prosecutor had not been put on
notice of the possibility that his file contained evidence favorable to the
defendant. Nevertheless, the Court held that this factor was not determinative in its consideration of Agurs' motion for a new trial. The Court said
there may be cases where certain evidence "is obviously of such substantial
value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed
even without a specific request. 2 The Court felt, however, that the absence of a request was not irrelevant 0° If the defendant makes only a
general Brady request, or no request at all, the prosecutor is not put on
notice that he may possess certain exculpatory evidence. The Court stated
that in these situations, where the second level of materiality applies, the
"constitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher burden upon
the defendant."3
In establishing the second level of materiality, applicable when the defendant has failed to make a specific Brady request, the Court balanced
the prosecutor's obligation to serve justice against the suggestion that the
prosecutor must routinely deliver his entire file to defense counsel. 32 The
Court felt that the fact that the evidence was in the hands of the prosecution at the time of trial but not made available to the defense distinguished
it from evidence discovered from a neutral source after trial:
For that reason the defendant should not have to satisfy the severe burden
of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would have
resulted in acquittal [the standard under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure]. If the standard applied to the usual motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence were the same when the
evidence was in the State's possession as when it was found in a neutral
source, there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice.""
27. Id. at
28. Id.
29. Id. at

,

96 S.Ct. at 2399.

,

96 S.Ct. at 2401.

30. Id. See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Id. at
, 96 S.Ct. at 2401.
32. Id.
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Nevertheless, the Court rejected the argument that the prosecution had a
duty routinely to deliver his entire file to the defense. 4 Striking what it felt
was the proper balance, the Court indicated that the proper standard of
materiality should reflect the requirement that the jury find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 The Court held that a new trial is
required only if "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist."3 In explaining this standard the Court stated:
This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the
entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not
the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new
trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity,
additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt."
The Court indicated that the new, two-tier test of materiality was the
same standard that other courts had applied "although the standard has
been phrased in different language."" The cases cited in support of that
belief do not substantiate the Court's assertion.39 Evidently the Court has
fashioned a completely new standard of Brady materiality.',
The two-level materiality test has no precedent in any reported cases
from the courts of appeals. Since the first level of materiality is a rather
low one, a probable effect of this case will be that prosecutors will feel more
compelled to respond to specific discovery requests for Brady material. But
defense attorneys are usually not aware of the existence of exculpatory
evidence in the possession of the prosecution and consequently are not in
a position to make a specific request for disclosure of that evidence. Therefore, the test that will be applied in almost every Brady-like case is the
higher level of materiality, the second level "reasonable doubt" test. This
standard presents a much higher barrier to a new trial than did any standard previously employed by the courts of appeals. In effect the standard
requires that the suppressed evidence, if disclosed and used, would have
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 2402 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 2402.
39. See Marshall's dissenting opinion. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 2404.
40. In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's variable standard of
materiality based upon prosecutorial culpability. The Court found that the duty to disclose
would arise equally in situations where the prosecution had innocently overlooked highly
exculpatory evidence as well as in situations where inept prosecutors incorrectly believed they
were suppressing vital exculpatory evidence. The Court thought that Constitutional error
results from the "character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." The Court
also rejected the argument that the standard of materiality should reflect the importance that
the undisclosed evidence bore to the preparation of the defense. Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 2400-

388
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resulted in an acquittal." The Court further encourages prosecutors' nondisclosure by eliminating all prophylactic considerations from the determination of materiality. 2 Finally, assuming that most prosecutors honestly
attempt to serve the cause of justice, they will not normally have in their
possession evidence that would result in the acquittal of the defendant. All
these factors combine to make it clear that the prosecution will have little
incentive to discover and disclose to the defense favorable evidence in its
possession. Thus, the major impact of the Agurs case is that the prosecution will feel much more confortable in resolving questions of disclosure in
favor of concealment.
JAMES
41.
42.

See Marshall's dissenting opinion. Id. at
Id. at -,
96 S.Ct. at 2400.

-

, 96 S.Ct. at 2404.
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